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Abstract
This study investigates the gender dimension of the
dynamic relationship between training and other
aspects of the reward structure of the labour market
by using structural equation modelling to develop a
causal model of women's training participation based
on feminist theory. The model uses data from Statistics
Canada's new Workplace and Employee Survey (WES).
Résumé
Cette étude examine la dimension de la relation
dynamique entre la formation et les autres façons de
récompenser du marché du travail, en se servant
d'exemple modèle d'équation structurale pour
développer au hasard un modèle de la participation
des femmes à la formation basé sur la théorie
féministe. Le modèle se sert des données de la
nouvelle Enquête sur le milieu de travail et les
employés (EMTE) de Statistiques Canada.
Introduction
The restructuring of Canada's economy is
marked by the shift from manufacturing to service,
the re-organization of work, deregulation, and
technological innovation. The current rhetoric suggests
a positive link between these trends of the post-
industrial economy and human resource development.
For many Canadians, training has become crucial for
establishing and maintaining employability in the new
economy. Yet, a disparity between the "training-haves"
and "training-have-nots" has been apparent for some
years now and gender is one of the axes along which
training is unevenly distributed.
The labour market and training policies,
characteristic of the last few decades, have attempted
to revitalize a weakened economy with an
appropriately skilled workforce by facilitating women's
entry into non-traditional occupations. However,
because female-dominated occupations continue to
provide greater employment opportunities for women,
and women tend to make training choices on the
basis of what they perceive will give them an
immediate, rather than long-term advantage, a gender
imbalance in training programs persists (Gaskell 1992).
Further, the gendered division of domestic labour acts
as a barrier to women's training participation. Even
with the convenience provided by the new learning
technologies, women do not have the same amount of
time available to engage in training as men do
(Lipsett 2000).
Training participation, the subject of this
study, is a complex and multi-dimensional
phenomenon. An analysis of the relationships between
the determinants of training and the role of training
in the reward structure of the labour market requires
a method that has the capacity to test cause-and-
effect hypotheses simultaneously. Structural equation
modeling is one of the few linear statistical methods
with such a capacity. This study uses a feminist
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theoretical framework to develop a structural equation
model of the gendered structure of the labour market
and its influences on both women's training
participation and their labour market rewards. We
open with the theory which underpins the
hypothesized model, then describe the method, data,
and hypothesized model. A discussion of the results
follows. Finally, we close by offering conclusions which
cast an eye to policy implications. 
More Than "Adding and Stirring": Explaining Women
in the Labour Market
The two foundational labour market theories,
human capital and segmentation theory, are unable to
explain adequately the persistently sex-segregated
nature of paid work. Human capital theory (Becker
1964) fails to account adequately for enduring
inequalities in the rates of return to human capital
investments between different groups; and while
segmentation theory (Gordon, Edwards & Reich 1982)
focuses on the structural barriers inherent in labour
markets, it treats women as a homogeneous group.
Both theories have been tested with the explicit
purpose of analyzing gender differences (Quinlan
2004); and, while the theories were found to hold in
general for both men and women, this work
demonstrates that simply "adding and stirring" women
into the foundational labour market theories does little
to account for the gender structure of the labour
market. A full appreciation of women's location in the
labour market requires feminist theory.
As far back as Charlotte Perkins Gilman
(1898), feminist theorists recognized the connection
between women's reproductive labour and their ability
to participate in paid work. More recently, Heidi
Hartmann's (1979) work suggests the existence of a
mutually reinforcing relationship between women's
domestic responsibilities and their subordinate position
in the labour market. Women find it more difficult to
achieve extended job tenure, and the associated
increases in earnings, because of their family
responsibilities. Conversely, because women's labour
market rewards are less than men's, they tend to be
responsible for domestic work. 
The dynamic relationship between women's
paid and unpaid work is best understood within the
context of the contradictions of contemporary
capitalism. As Smith (1985) argues, with the growing
use of technology in the production process, industrial
capitalism becomes increasingly indifferent to social
differentiations such as gender. Because engagement in
the productive processes requires less physical strength
than it once did, women can now compete with men
for jobs. But, since women's labour market equality
jeopardizes family life and in particular women's role
in the family, new ways of gendering work are
needed. Stratifying the paid labour force on the basis
of sex (that is, gendered occupational segregation) is
one way of reducing the competition and thereby
ensuring women's traditional role within the family. 
The post-war labour-capital accord, known
as the Fordist contract, was built on the notion of a
family wage (Rubery, Smith, & Fagan 1998). The
inequality of men's and women's wages was justified
on the basis that women did not support a family,
whether or not this was indeed the case. Thus, the
way most women received a living wage was to marry
and share in the "family" wage in exchange for their
domestic work. But, in recent times, the Fordist
contract has all but collapsed. Full-time, full-year
employment has rapidly been replaced by non-standard
work: part-time, part-year or temporary employment,
multiple job-holding, or own-account self-employment.
The family wage has been virtually eliminated and
more than half of the adult workforce lack
employment stability and/or market income sufficiency
(Shields and Burke 1999). The breakdown of the
Fordist contract has provided significant economic
motivation for women to enter the labour force. Not
surprisingly, women are now participating in the
Canadian labour market at unprecedented rates.
Some have argued that in the post-Fordist
economy, the sexual division of domestic labour and
its gendered relationship to paid employment breaks
down. For instance, Siltanen (1994) suggests that the
conventional distinction between bread-winning and
child-rearing no longer holds up in the face of the
massive increase in the number of employed women
who have children. But, have things really changed for
women, or is this merely wishful thinking on Siltanen's
part? 
Despite the recent labour market
restructuring, which has provided new opportunities to
women, some of these in the professional, managerial,
and technical occupations, four fifths of Canadian
women are concentrated in traditional occupations,
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occupations that represent one quarter of all those
available (Hughes 1998). The effect of occupational
segregation on women's compensation is clear: when
all other factors are controlled for, occupational
segregation is one of the largest contributors to the
wage gap between the sexes (England et al. 1994).
A comprehensive national system of
affordable, quality child care remains as elusive as it
did prior to the 1993 Liberal Red Book promise. In
general, the trend is towards increasing privatization
of a whole array of what once were state-supported
care services, a trend that imposes immeasurable
stress on women, particularly low-income, single-
parent, working women. Statistics indicate that despite
women's increased labour market participation, they
continue to shoulder the majority of domestic and
family responsibilities; consequently, many report that
they are "severely time-stressed" (Statistics Canada
1999). Despite the pressures of their second shift,
mothers, both employed and unemployed, have
preserved, even increased the time they dedicate to
their children (Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg
2004). It seems clear that the argument for changing
the indicators of our nation's level of productivity to
reflect time spent parenting is no less relevant now
than when Marilyn Waring (1988) first raised it a
couple decades ago.
Method
Testing social science theory often involves
developing models of cause-and-effect relationships
between constructs, which represent concepts that
cannot be observed or measured directly: for example,
discrimination, intelligence, and social class. Social
scientists use structural equation modelling (SEM) to
design and test such models.1
In comparison to many other linear
statistical methods, SEM has a greater capacity to
simultaneously test multiple and complex cause-and-
effect relationships. Moreover, structural equation
modeling has the capacity to distinguish between
direct and indirect effects.
Cause-and-effect relationships embedded in a
structural equation model are tested by evaluating
how closely a particular sample of data matches the
hypothesized model. If a model is found to be
consistent with the data, we can say that the causal
assumptions underpinning the model are not
contradicted and may be valid. We only can say "may
be valid" because other models, reflecting different
causal assumptions, also may fit the data. Another
limitation of what SEM can deliver arises from our
understanding that in causal relationships the alleged
cause precedes the effect. Thus, to test cause-and-
effect relationships, longitudinal data are most
desirable. Because this study does not use longitudinal
data, the causal relationships implied by the study's
model must remain tentative until such data are
available.
Model-building starts with a hypothesized
model, a set of causal relationships which are
hypothesized from existing theory and empirical
studies. Using one of the many modelling programs
now available (this study uses EQS Structural Equation
Modeling Software), the hypothesized model is tested,
adjusted, and re-tested. Models are evaluated by
examining: 1) the parameter estimates, numerical
values associated with each path in the diagram, and
2) the fit indices, overall measures of how well the
model matches the data (see Table 1). These
evaluative tools are generated by the modelling
programs.
Data Source
The Workplace and Employee Survey (WES),
the study's data source, is the first and only
employer-employee linked, national-level survey in
Canada. This recently launched Statistics Canada survey
samples workplaces and then employees within these
workplaces from lists provided by employers. The first
wave of the survey in 1999 captures data from 6,351
workplaces from 24,597 employees (13,977 men and
10,620 women), with a response rate of 83 percent
(Statistics Canada 2001a). For the purposes of this
study's model-building, a sample of 3,568 cases is
generated by randomly selecting one third of the
women-only WES cases (N = 10,620). The remaining
two-thirds of cases are reserved for cross-validation of
the model. Missing data are handled by Statistics
Canada before the datafile is released. 
Although the WES is extremely ambitious in
scope, and all efforts were made to make the survey
representative, there are exclusions to the sample.
Only women in the formal, paid labour market are
surveyed. Farm wives, domestic workers and any other
self-employed women, and, of course, street-workers,
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and other labourers of the underground economy, are
not included.
The Model
The study's model emphasizes the factors
affecting women's labour market participation that
have been highlighted by feminist theory. Factors that
are the focus of the foundational labour market
theories are explicitly not included in this model (for
example, age, level of education) in order that the
feminist theory can be given centre stage. Models
reflecting the foundational theories have been
developed, comprehensively tested, and evaluated for
their gender differences (Quinlan 2004). 
The model below uses variables from
Workplace and Employee Survey. The variables and
their relationships to each other form a structural
equation model. The hypothesized structural equation
model is presented in conceptual form in Figure 1.
The variable definitions are provided in Table A.1,
Appendix A. From these variables, constructs, which
are concepts that might not be observed or measured
directly, have been developed using factor analysis. For
example, benefits and hourly wages, together, indicate
compensation, and the number of dependent children
and marital_status indicate family responsibilities.
In structural equation model diagrams, such
as Figure 1, rectangles represent observed variables
and ellipses represent constructs. Two-word variable or
construct names are indicated by underscore
hyphenation, and the names of constructs are italicized
to distinguish them from variables. Arrows point from
constructs to their indicator variables. Arrows in the
diagram also point from predictors to outcomes: e.g.,
job_experience predicts training. The paths in Figure 1
are labelled to correspond to the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Family_responsibilities have a negative
effect on job_experience.
Hypothesis 2: Family_responsibilities have a negative
effect on training.
Hypothesis 3: Family_responsibilities and
labour_market_segregation have a reciprocal
reinforcing (positive) relationship.
Hypothesis 4: Labour_market_segregation has a
negative effect on training.
Hypothesis 5: Job_experience has a negative effect on
training. 
Hypothesis 6: Labour_market_segregation has a
negative effect on compensation.
Hypothesis 7: Training has a positive effect on
compensation. 
Hypothesis 8: Job_experience has a positive effect on
compensation. 
Results
Guided by the hypotheses stated above,
models were tested sequentially and systematically. The
fit indices obtained in the final model (CFI = 0.95;
RMSEA = 0.04) are well within the desired thresholds
(Table 1). Further, the cross-validation performed on
the model provides favourable evidence of replication
and thereby offers a reasonable degree of confidence
that the model generalizes to the larger population.  2
Figure 2 provides the results of the final
model in conceptual form with the parameter
estimates associated with each cause-and-effect
relationship. (See Appendix B for the results in EQS
output form.) The dotted paths in Figure 2 indicate
hypothesized paths that are found not to be
significant. The deviations from the hypotheses, or
otherwise interesting findings, are explored in the
following paragraphs. 
i) Family responsibilities have a positive, not
negative effect on women's job experience (Hypothesis
1); and 
ii) Family responsibilities have a positive,
not a negative effect on women's training participation
(Hypothesis 2).
These findings demonstrate that the more
family responsibilities a woman has, the more training
she participates in and the more job experience she
accumulates. Although the effects are not large (0.21
for job experience and 0.07 for training), the very
existence of a positive path suggest a change in the
prevailing winds: even as recently as the mid-1990s,
almost one-quarter (23%) of women reported that the
presence of children was a barrier to their training
participation (Gomez 1997). 
iii) Contrary to Hypothesis 3, there is no
reciprocal relationship between family responsibilities
and gendered labour market segregation. This finding
suggests that there is no direct relationship between
women's unpaid work and their segregation into
certain occupations and industries in the paid labour
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market. Assuming such a relationship was present a
few decades ago, we can conclude from the model
results that it is no longer there.
iv) There is no direct effect of labour
market segregation on training, contrary to Hypothesis
4. However, there is an indirect, negative effect
through job experience. Although it is small (-0.08), it
is significant nonetheless.
v) The path from labour market segregation
to job experience is not originally hypothesized, but
found to be significant. The effect is positive, albeit
small (+0.18). Noting that an increase in the
labour_market_segregation construct represents an
increase in the proportion of women in the employee's
occupation and industry, we can interpret the
existence of the positive path in the following way:
women's job experience is dependent on the extent of
the presence of other women in the occupation and
industry. So, the more female-dominated the
occupation, the longer women's job tenure. The few
women who are in the male-dominated occupations,
either for the sake of the higher wages and status or
simply because they enjoy the work, find the
environment too difficult, too "chilly" to stay in the
job for long.
vi) Of all the predictors of compensation,
training has the strongest total effect (Table B.1,
Appendix B). With a coefficient of +0.976, its effect
on compensation is extremely strong. In fact, in
comparison to all other direct effects, this is the
largest of all those in the entire model (Figure 2). The
strongest predictor of compensation is found to be
training, even when all the effects, both direct and
indirect, are considered. Second to training in its
power to predict compensation is job experience,
which has less than one-half the potency in
comparison to training. 
Discussion of Results
The model identifies that the more male-
dominated the occupation is, the less time a woman
stays in it. This has the effect of reinforcing the
occupation's gender composition. With this finding, the
model verifies an essential assertion of the feminist
theory: that is, women and men are assigned to
fundamentally different types of occupations. While
capitalism establishes the divisions between
occupations, it is patriarchy that imposes a gender
assignment to these divisions. Furthermore, by
demonstrating that gender segregation negatively
influences women's compensation, the model lends
credence to the aspect of feminist theory that speaks
to the devaluation of women-specific work. 
One of the most important findings of the
study is that training is a crucial element in the
reward structure of the labour market for women, as
it plays a dual role of both a reward in itself and a
predictor of other labour market rewards. Training is
an investment, along with other elements of a total
compensation package, devised to both attract high-
skilled employees and reward them for their high
productivity. The study's model confirms that the
training-to-compensation link is a positive one for
women: the more training, the more compensation.
This finding might be explained, at least in part,
because the study's training variable privileges
employer-sponsored training (Table A.1, Appendix A).
Employees tend to invest in general training because
it is more portable and can realize a return with
many potential employers, whereas employers tend to
invest in specific training.
Another notable finding of the study is that
family responsibilities are no longer dissuading women
from engaging in training; in fact, family
responsibilities prompt women to participate in
training. Whether it is despite, or because of, family
responsibilities, we can say that the presence of family
responsibilities is no longer the barrier it once was.
While the specific reasons for this are outside the
model, we can speculate on the reasons for this. First,
distance education has grown up over the past few
decades. No longer limited to correspondence courses,
students in adult education programs now have a
buffet of modes to choose from: computer
conferencing, long-distance telephone tutoring, and
televised lectures. Second, the ethic of life-long
learning has gathered steam over the past few years,
with its hypnotic chant now drawing in both men and
women. It seems that the presence of a first and a
second shift are no longer significant deterrents to
women's engagement in training. 
Could it be that women are engaging in
training and gaining job experience, not in spite of,
but because of, their family responsibilities?
Conceivably, responsibilities for women, like men, are
now an incentive, rather than a disincentive, to
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engage in training and accumulate job experience.
Given the increase in the number of single-parent
families, which are predominately headed up by
women, this is entirely plausible. It would seem that
women are indeed no longer a reserve army, as
theorized by Connelly (1978). Women are anxious to
be full participants in the labour market and they
want a return on their participation. Training increases
that return.
Conclusions
According to all the statistical indicators
used by the study, the model adheres to the data,
and therefore offers confirmation of the underlying
theory. Most of the deviations from the theory occur
where direct effects were hypothesized; the results
indicate that while these effects exist, they are
indirect. For instance, labour market segregation has
only an indirect effect on training participation. Other
deviations, though, represent perplexing departures
from aspects of the underlying theory. In particular,
the model indicates that there is no relationship
between family responsibilities and gendered labour
market segregation. 
The hypotheses of the model were based, in
part, on previous empirical studies that largely have
used multiple regression to model training and
compensation, a technique that makes it difficult to
distinguish between these two types of effects. By
differentiating between direct and indirect effects, this
study makes a contribution to the body of literature
on the subject. The two most notable findings of the
study are: 1) that for women training is the strongest
determinant of compensation and, 2) that family
responsibilities are not impairing women's participation
in job-related training. 
Although the study demonstrates that
training is the strongest determinant of women's
compensation, we need to be wary of presenting
women's participation in training as a ready-made
solution to the gendered wage gap. Since engaging in
training takes time, for women, particularly those with
substantial family responsibilities, the requirement of
more than a few hours, in addition to those required
by their job, is likely to be a significant barrier to
their participation in training. Even if increasing
women's training were a viable possibility, the solution
puts the onus on individual women, rather than on
collective solutions that can be achieved through social
and labour market policies.
The study suggests that family
responsibilities are no longer an impediment to
women's participation in training; however, we cannot
assume that equity policies can be thrown on the
scrap heap. Because women, on an individual level,
have demonstrated their commitment to training does
not suggest that governments may abdicate their
responsibility of developing, promoting, and enforcing
appropriate social and labour market policy. In fact,
quite the converse: women's demonstrated commitment
to training is a good argument in favour of equity
policies. The model suggests that women are willing to
engage in training and they are deriving benefits from
it. Comparing the strength of all the predictors of
compensation, direct and indirect, we find that
participation in training has the greatest impact on
women's wages and benefits. From this result, we can
conclude that any efforts to make it easier for women
to continue their participation in training will not be
wasted. 
With the additional supports provided by
sound equity policies, in all likelihood more women
would engage in more training. For women, especially
those with family responsibilities, time is a barrier to
participation in training. The issue of when training
was undertaken is not included in this study. It is
reasonable to suspect, however, that there is a ceiling
on the number of hours, outside work, that women
with family responsibilities are donating to training,
and that the ceiling is lower than that for their male
counterparts.
Further, we do not know the costs to
women with family responsibilities engaging in
training. Contrary to the predictions formulated in
previous decades, women are not doing less unpaid
work, despite the increase in the amount of their paid
work. While women are avoiding work-family conflict
by not having children, they cannot avoid having
parents (Duxbury and Higgins 2002). Many of these
parents are living longer and have debilitating,
degenerative health problems, and there are still huge
gaps within and between home-care and long-term
nursing care. The increasing care-burden on sandwich-
generation women makes it difficult for them to
participate equally as trainees and productive
employees, although the study's findings indicate that
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they are doing it nonetheless. The fact that women
seem to be doing it all - engaging in training while
carrying their family responsibilities - likely has huge
implications for women's health. Since long-term costs
to women's health and the health of society, vis-à-vis
child development, are outside of the model, this is an
area to explore in future work. But we can speculate
that the costs to women engaging in training are
greater than those for their male counterparts, as
women continue to shoulder most of the domestic
responsibilities. Family-friendly workplace policies
reduce these costs for women, and therefore, for
society in general. However, it seems evident that we
also need bold, sweeping, provocative initiatives that
go well beyond the often-proposed family illness leave
options, child-care programs, and flexible work
schedules. We need to come to our policy-visioning-
circles with fresh, new ideas for publicly funded and
delivered, child-care and walker-to-grave, elder-care
programs, such as cross-generational workplace care-
centres that attend to the care needs of both aging
seniors and infants, pre-schoolers, and latch-key kids,
and, at the same time, reconsider old ideas such as
collective kitchens, as proposed by Gilman (1898) over
a century ago.
Endnotes
1. The fundamentals of structural equation modelling
are discussed in Bollen, 1989; Byrne, 1994; Hoyle,
1995; Kline, 1998.
2. Cross-validation was done on three sub-samples. The
first sample consists of only odd-numbered cases, N =
5,321; the second consists of only even-numbered
cases, with N = 5299. And, finally the entire sample
of 10,620 cases was used.
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Appendix A: 
Variables Used in Model.
 Table A.1: Variables Required by Model, Hypotheses 1 - 8, listed alphabetically.
 Source: 1999 Workplace and Employee Survey, employee and employer questionnaires, Statistics Canada, 2001c 
Variable Name Variable Description
 benefits  Used to measure the construct, compensation.
 Derived from employee survey questions #37 a - g(i)* coded into integer values: 0 - 9, where 9 is presence of all the below- 
    listed benefits. 
 * "The following questions cover the non-wage benefits related to this job. If any of these benefits are optional, please answer  
 yes only if you participate in that benefit option. Does your employer have any non-wage benefits such as pension plan, life    
 insurance or dental plan? Are you included in any of the following plans: an employer-sponsored pension plan? A group RRSP? a 
 life insurance plan? a supplemental medical insurance plan? A dental plan? A stock purchase plan? Does your employer offer 




 Used to measure the construct, family_responsibilities.
 Derived from employee survey questions #53 and 53a *, is a weighted, cumulative variable calculated by multiplying type of   
 child by number of children in each category, where type of child is a ranked variable, as follows:
 0 = no children;
 1 = school-age child;
 2 = preschool-age child.
 See p. 52 of 1999 questionnaire for how to create dep_kids: integer values.
 Collapsed all values > or = 10 because of small cell size.
 * "Do you have dependent children? Please tell me their ages, starting with the youngest?"  
 industry     
segregation
 Used to measure the construct, labour_market_segregation.
 Derived by calculating the % of women in each industry; taken from post-coded variable (ie. there is no survey question) using 
    the 6-digit NAICS classification.
 1 = heavily male-dominated: 0 - 24.9% women;
 2 = male-dominated: 25 - 39.9% women;
 3 = mixed: 40 - 59.9% women;
 4 = female-dominated: 60 - 74% women;
 5 = heavily female-dominated: 75 - 100% women. 
 Note: inspiration for the scale is taken from Geschwender (1999). 
 job tenure  Used to measure the construct, job_experience.
 Derived from employee survey question #3 * by calculating a number of months working at this particular job, then coded    
into the following categories:
 0 = 0 - 12 months;
 1 = 13 - 24 months; 
 2 = 25 - 48 months;
 3 = 49 - 84 months;
 4 = 85 - 120 months; 
 5 = 121 - 180 months; 
 6 = more than 180 months.
 * "When did you start working at this particular job?"
 marital status  Used to measure the construct, family_responsibilities.
 Derived from employee survey questions #51 and 52 *, is dichotomous:
 0 = separated, divorced, widowed, or single and not living with a common-law partner.
 1 = married or living with a common-law partner.
 * "What is your current marital status? Are you currently living with a common-law partner?" 
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 occupation
 segregation
 Used to measure the construct, labour_market_segregation.
 Derived by calculating the % of women in each occupation, taken from post-coded variable (ie. there is no survey question),   
    which uses the 4-digit level (the most detailed level) of the 1991 Standard Occupation Classification.
 1 = heavily male-dominated: 0 - 24.9% women;
 2 = male-dominated: 25 - 39.9% women;
 3 = mixed: 40 - 59.9% women;
 4 = female-dominated: 60 - 74% women;
 5 = heavily female-dominated: 75 - 100% women. 
 Note: inspiration for the scale is taken from Geschwender (1999). 
 training received  in
the past 12 months. 
 Used to measure the construct, training.
 Derived from employee survey questions #25b(ii), #25c(ii), #25d(ii), #27b(ii), #27c(ii) *. The weighted cumulative variable  
 is calculated by multiplying type of training by total # of hours, where type of training is a ranked variable as follows: 
 0 = no training;
 1 = all non employer-sponsored training;
 2 = employer-sponsored, job-related, non-classroom training (i.e. on-the-job training);
 3 = employer-sponsored, job-related classroom training.
 Note: inspiration for the scale is taken from Tuijnman's (1989, 96) 3-category scale, with the following modifications: 
 a) classroom training replaces Tuijnman's credentialed training, 
 b) on-the-job training replaces Tuijnman's non-credit training. 
 c) inclusion of distinction based on employer-sponsorship is not included in Tuijnman's scale.
 Note: employer-sponsored training is defined in questionnaire as either "employer-provided or employer-paid." 
 Variable is in terms of hours, then recoded into the following categories:
 0 = 0 hours of training;
 1 = less than 0.5 hours of training;
 2 = 0.5 - 1 hours of training;
 3 = 1 - 2 hours of training;
 4 = 2 - 4 hours of training;
 5 = 4 - 8 hours of training;
 6 = 8 - 16 hours of training;
 7 = 16 - 40 hours of training;
 8 = 40 - 80 hours of training;
 9 = more than 80 of training.
 * "Thinking of the last classroom training course you completed in the past 12 months, how long was the course? And,        
continuing with the second most recent course, how long was the course? 
 In the past 12 months, have you received any on-the-job training related to your job? How much in total was spent for on-   
 the-job training? In the past 12 months, has your employer paid for or otherwise helped you to take courses outside your     
 paid working hours that were not directly job-related, but with an objective of career development? Thinking of the last        
 career-related training, not sponsored by your employer, that you completed in the past 12 months, how long was the course?  
 And, continuing with the second most recent course, how long was the course?" 
 Used to measure the construct, compensation. hourly wages
 Taken directly from the post-coded variable: post-coded using employee survey question #35 *, then transformed, as follows:
 hr_waget = 1 / hr_wage.
 * "In your current job, what is your usual wage or salary before taxes and other deductions?"
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Appendix B: 
Model Results.
Table B.1: Unstandardized Solution, Total and Indirect Effects, and Standardized Solution for Feminist Model - Run Against Women Only
Sample: N = 3,568. 
CONSTRUCT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 =  .839*F1  + .244*F2  + 1.000 D3             
     .119      .066                      
           7.077     3.716                      
 
TRAINING = F4 =  -.551*F3  + .353*F1  + 1.000 D4             
           .139      .121                      
          -3.951     2.911                      
 
COMPENSATION = F5 =  .847*F3  + .795*F4  - .423*F2  + 1.000 D5      
          .174      .102     .095               
             4.878     7.787    -4.463               
Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1;  
LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.
DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH NONSTANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER TOTAL EFFECTS *
 
JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 =  .244*F2  + .839*F1  + .244 D2  + 1.000 D3      
 
TRAINING = F4 =  -.134 F2  + -.551*F3  + -.109*F1  + -.134 D2      
           -.551 D3  + 1.000 D4                    
 
COMPENSATION = F5 =  -.323*F2  + .410*F3  + .795*F4  + .625 F1      
             -.323 D2  + .410 D3  + .795 D4  + 1.000 D5      
 
* Note: EQS 5.7b does not provide standard errors and z-statistics for total effects. 
DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH NONSTANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER INDIRECT EFFECTS
JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 =  .244 D2                           
   .066                             
               3.717                             
 
TRAINING = F4 =  -.134 F2  + -.462*F1  + -.134 D2  + -.551 D3      
           .047      .118      .047      .139        
     -2.835    -3.919     -2.835     -3.953        
 
COMPENSATION = F5 =  .100*F2  + -.438*F3  + .625 F1  + -.323 D2   +      
              .040     .085      .109      .072        
       2.526    -5.182      5.722     -4.464        
 
          .410 D3  + .795 D4                    
          .117      .102                      
             3.509     7.785                      
DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH STANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER TOTAL EFFECTS
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JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 =  .214*F1  + .177*F2  + .961 D3             
 
TRAINING = F4 =  -.427*F3  + -.021*F1  + -.076 F2  + -.410 D3   + .908 D4                           
COMPENSATION = F5 =  .390*F3  + .976*F4  + .152 F1  + -.224*F2 + .375 D3  
+ 
.887 D4  + .000 D5             
Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS:  FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1;  
LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.
DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS WITH STANDARDIZED VALUES
PARAMETER INDIRECT EFFECTS
TRAINING = F4 =  -.091*F1  + -.076 F2  + -.410 D3             
 
COMPENSATION = F5 =  -.417*F3  + .152 F1  + .069*F2  + .375 D3  +  .887 D4                
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION:                       R-SQUARED
TENUREC =V3 =  .634 F3  + .773 E3           .402 
MAR_STAT=V4 = 1.000*F1  + .000 E4               1.000 
DEP_KIDS=V5 =  .224 F1  + .975 E5               .050 
OCCUPSEG=V10 =  .624 F2  + .782 E10               .389 
HR_WAGET=V18 = -.709*F5  + .705 E18              .502 
BENEFITS=V19 =  .451 F5  + .893 E19               .203 
TRAINC =V20 =  .470 F4  + .883 E20               .221 
INDSEG =V21 =  .393*F2  + .920 E21               .154 
 
JOB EXPERIENCE = F3 =  .214*F1  + .177*F2  + .961 D3   .077 
TRAINING = F4 = -.427*F3  + .070*F1  + .908 D4        .175 
COMPENSATION = F5 =  .807*F3  + .976*F4  - .293*F2  + .000 D5    1.000 
Note: EXOGENOUS FACTORS:  FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES = F1;  
LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION = F2.
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  Table 1: Evaluation of Structural Equation Models.
Evaluation Tool Meaning
 Parameter estimates  These values represent the amount of change in the predicted variable or construct, as a result of  
  one (standardized) unit of change in the predictor variable/construct, assuming all other predictors 
  constant. 
 Fit Indices  These values reflect how closely the data match the hypothesized model. Indices that do not       
 meet the commonly accepted thresholds indicate an unacceptable level of chance of reaching false  
 conclusions. This study uses Hu and Bentler's (1999) recommendations on the appropriate fit       
 indices: 
 1) the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) should be greater than or = 0.95 for an adequately fitting     
 model; and 2) the Root Mean Square Effects Approximation (RMSEA) should be less than or =     
 0.06.  
 A perfect fit would be indicated by a CFI of 1.0 and a RMSEA of 0.0; few models ever achieve a   
 perfect fit. 
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